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Abstract
Joan Robinson and Paul Samuelson found little to agree upon in a correspondence
which began in 1946, shortly after the death of Keynes, and ended a year prior to
Robinson’s death in 1983. One way to read the correspondence is to keep in mind that
Keynesian uncertainty was central to Robinson’s understanding of how capitalist
economies function. Samuelson, never impressed by Keynes’s handling of uncertainty,
understood capital theory—if not capitalsim—in terms of dynamic programming, with
its perfect foresight entailments. This is evident throughout his letters to Robinson,
although rarely acknowledged in a straightforward way, particularly during the period
from 1971 until 1975 when their disagreements came to a head. On several occasions,
Robinson despaired of making any progress in getting Samuelson to acknowledge the
importance of her questions. Unfailingly polite to her, he granted only in a letter to
Solow that, “She is on to a real problem...”
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Keynesian Uncertainty: The Great Divide between Joan Robinson and
Paul Samuelson in their Correspondence and Public Exchanges

Harvey Gram with the collaboration of G.C. Harcourt1

1. Introduction

The Joan Robinson/Paul Samuelson correspondence spans a period of thirty-six years.2
An initial five letters are mutually flattering. Robinson begins, complimenting
Samuelson (22 October 1946) on his “amusing and penetrating article on Keynes.”
Samuelson had joked, “I hasten to add – as who does not? – that I am not myself a
Keynesian, although some of my best friends are” (Samuelson 1946: 188). He questions
Keynes’s analytical abilities: “Indeed, until the appearance of the mathematical models
of Meade, Lange, Hicks, and Harrod there is reason to believe that Keynes himself did

1

We wish to acknowledge Donald J. Harris for insightful comments based in part on

first hand discussions he had with Joan Robinson and Frank Hahn, among others, during
the time he spent at Cambridge University. Prue Kerr has also read our drafts and made
important points about how mathematics has affected and infected methodological
debates.
2

Our main source of letters and other communications is Box 63 of the Paul A.

Samuelson Papers, 1933-2010, located in the Rubenstein Library at Duke University.
The Papers of Richard Ferdinand Kahn at King’s College Archive, Cambridge
University, contain some of that same correspondence. All underlining in the quoted
letters was in the original.
3

not truly understand his own analysis” (ibid.); and faulted Keynes’s most famous work
for failing to deliver on its promise: “As for expectations, the General Theory is brilliant
in calling attention to their importance and in suggesting many of the central features of
uncertainty and speculation. It paves the way for a theory of expectations, but it hardly
provides one” (ibid.: 192). Samuelson acknowledged that Keynes, on at least one
occasion, had shown interest in “an esoteric theoretical problem, [giving] a rather
intricate interpretation in words of a calculus-of-variations differential-equation
condition of equilibrium” (ibid.: 196, fn. 8). He was referring to Ramsey (1928) – which
presages Samuelson and Solow (1956) and Dorfman et al. (1958) – referred to on
numerous occasions in Samuelson’s correspondence with Robinson. There is no
mention of Keynesian uncertainty or speculation in this later work, whereas Ramsey is
given star billing (see Samuelson and Solow 1956: 537).

Suggesting (2 January 1947) that Robinson make a “grand tour”, Samuelson writes,
“Along with all American economists, I have always been intensely interested in your
writings.” He repeats the invitation to “visit our shores” (23 May 1949), adding: “I read
with great pleasure your review article on Harrod [Robinson, 1949] … Perhaps if
Harrod’s lectures serve to provoke interesting discussions such as yours, I will have to
modify my critical judgement.” She returns the compliment (11 December 1950): “I
much enjoyed your piece in Economica (I didn’t try the appendix).” The charming style
of Samuelson (1950) on the problem of integrability of utility functions involving more
than two goods no doubt appealed to Robinson.

In the last of these initial letters (17 May 1951), Samuelson acknowledges hearing that
Robinson is working on a new project: “I take it as the best possible news that we can
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soon look forward to another book of yours, and one on so interesting a subject.” Her
famous critique of the production function in the theory of capital (Robinson, 19531954) was followed by that book, her magnum opus (Robinson 1956)3 and its sequel
(Robinson 1962a). In all of this work, Keynesian uncertainty, though not always central
to the discussion, is never lost sight of.

Seven years pass before the first rumblings of disagreements are heard in three rapidfire letters in early 1958 – disagreements that would, in the end, never be resolved. The
last of these finds Robinson concluding on a despairing note (9 February 1958): “But I
think you and Solow are a case of None so deaf as he who will not hear – so I shan’t
make myself hoarse shouting at you. Much look forward to seeing you later this year.”
A further pause ensued, followed by five letters from 1959 dealing with questions
arising from Samuelson’s famous paper on consumption-loans (Samuelson 1958).

In 1961, Robinson finally made the “grand tour”. Following a seminar at MIT,
Samuelson recorded that she had asked him “when you say the real wage is the
marginal product of something, what is that something and what is it that is ‘being held
constant’?” His initial answer:4 “Er, er. The kings of England were William…and
3

For the long history behind this book, see Harcourt and Kerr (2013).
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In a letter (31 March 1961) to Kahn following the MIT seminar, Robinson

remembered it this way: “He replied – you have a point there – I do not know the
answer … [I]t seems he just was disconcerted … [A]ll very amiable tho’ hard hitting
and plenty of good humoured banter.” In a follow-up (2 April 1961) to Kahn, she
added: “[I]t is remarkable that he should never have asked himself this simple question
before…and turn it to a joke against himself. But I wonder if the point will sink in.”
5

besides the interest rate or profit rate is identifiable as a certain physical marginal
product concept, namely the tradeoff twixt today’s and tomorrow’s consumption
goods.” Her response: “Come, come, sir. Answer the question.” Samuelson’s memo set
forth three answers dated 6:30 AM on the day after the seminar, implying a sleepless
night struggling to cover all his bases! The protagonists were evidently enjoying the

Robinson’s doubts are recalled in her 1977 Reminiscences: “It was great fun to tease
Samuelson, but this debate took attention away from the main issue” (Robinson 1978:
xviii, cited in Turner 1989: 171-172). There, she reported that “the answer [Samuelson
gave to the question] is that either you keep all physical inputs constant or you keep the
rate of interest constant.” In the latter case, the main issue between them was what
determined the rate of interest. For Samuelson, it was “the tradeoff twixt today’s and
tomorrow’s consumption goods.” This would never satisfy Robinson because it only
made sense in a world where output is continuously constrained by an economy’s
production possibilities. She wanted a more general theory of the economy-wide rate of
profits, such as she would offer in Robinson (1962a: 48-51). As for the short run,
“keeping all physical inputs constant” was not the traditional basis upon which to define
the marginal product of labor. Indeed, it was an old question, long discussed in
Cambridge and elsewhere. Stigler (1952: 117, 1987: 136), echoing Robertson (1931:
48), found it reasonable to hold constant total expenditure on non-labor inputs while
allowing their form to vary. Whether or not one accepts this way around the problem,
estimates of, say, the marginal rate of substitution between more and less computerliterate workers – the ratio of their marginal products – would be quite meaningless
without also knowing the prior level of investment in computer equipment (for
empirical work, see Lichtenberg 1995).
6

joust, but whether Samuelson’s answers satisfied Robinson is unclear.5 In any case, over
the following six years, some thirty-four letters attest to the seriousness with which each
attempted to understand and to criticize the other’s positions on various matters relating
to capital theory and the distribution of income. It all came to naught. On 11 May 1967,
Robinson dashed off a final volley, “I fear it’s hopeless. Goodbye.”

Four years later, communication resumed in some two dozen letters written over the
period 1971-1975. Robinson argued for an essential difference between various systems
of prices and their associated schools of thought. Samuelson saw only a set of variations
on a general equilibrium theory of supply and demand. In a response to her published
note on model types (Robinson 1973), he threw up his hands, empowering “the
reader…to strike out the label ‘Walrasian,’ substituting for it ‘Ricardian,’
‘Bortkiewiczian,’ ‘Sraffian,’ or other similar adjectives” (Samuelson 1973: 1367). His
well-known penchant for stringing together the names of famous progenitors of modern
theory was only intended to give credit where credit was due. He did not agree with
Robinson that different types of problems required different theories of price. Her own
fully developed thesis first appeared in Robinson (1958) to which she made reference
(21 January 1972): “I would be very much obliged if you would read a piece called The
Philosophy of Prices.” Samuelson wrote back (29 January 1972) saying only that he had
“found it as I remembered it.”

Much attention was paid in the letters of this period to the problem of constant returns
5

In her own theory of marginal productivity pricing, under conditions of imperfect

competition, “the marginal net product of labour (after allowing for raw materials,
power and maintenance of plant) is equal to the wage plus profit” (Robinson 1967: 77).
7

in Sraffa. Samuelson initially asked Robinson in early 1972 if Sraffa’s “constant
returns” means constant returns to scale or (as becomes clear in a subsequent letter)
constant opportunity cost. A notation in the margin, “What else could it mean?” is in
Sraffa’s hand and initialed “P.” Exasperation soon set in on both sides. Robinson wrote
(18 April 1972), “There is none so blind as he who will not see.” Samuelson responded,
“I feel I am wasting time better spent on other things. Here are my final words on this
matter.” But this was not the end of it. Robinson had submitted “The Unimportance of
Reswitching” to the Quarterly Journal of Economics (Robinson 1975a), and sent a draft
to Samuelson (15 June 1973). For her, it marked a final turning away from many of the
formal problems that had so interested protagonists on both sides of the capital theory
controversy. Samuelson saw the article as an opportunity for him and Solow to set
matters straight in the pages of the journal wherein the famous “Paradoxes in Capital
Theory: A Symposium” had first appeared.6 In one of four long letters, Samuelson
remarked to Solow: “[A]s any examination of the dirt on the pages of the bound
volumes of the QJE…will verify, [the 1966 Symposium issue] was in fact one of the
most read in its history.” These letters were, indeed, drafts of their replies to Robinson
(Samuelson 1975; Solow 1975). Another, longer paper (Samuelson 1976) also emerged
from this correspondence with Solow, filling out Samuelson’s response to what he had
described to Solow (9 July 1973) as Robinson’s “disconnected remarks.”

6

The editor of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Richard Musgrave, wrote to

Samuelson (3 July 1973), in reaction to Robinson’s submission: “We don’t think it very
novel, but suppose that the prominence of the author suggests we take it in any case. We
shall, of course, be glad to have a brief rejoinder by you, Bob [Solow] or, perhaps, the
two of you jointly.”
8

Again, it all came to naught. Asking Samuelson for permission to include part of his
response to “The Unimportance…” in her Collected Economic Papers, Robinson again
despaired (30 March 1978): “I am sorry we have never been able to get to the bottom of
this dispute.” Samuelson replied: “You would not believe the hours I spend reading
your writings … You should take satisfaction that you have had a major impact on three
generations of economists. Ever, Paul.” Four years later (12 March 1982), upon her
return from India, Robinson sent her last letter to Samuelson, evidently puzzled by what
he had written: “I was somewhat mystified…but I am glad to know there is no ill will.
Yours, Joan Robinson.”

Section 2 of this chapter takes up the five letters between Robinson and Samuelson
concerning his consumption-loan model. Section 3 covers the bulk of their letters,
setting forth conflicting points of view in three overlapping areas, all concerned in one
way or another with capital theory and the distribution of income. What often gets lost
in the weeds of their back-and-forth is the simple fact that Keynesian uncertainty is
central to Robinson’s understanding of what constitutes an acceptable economic theory
of accumulation and growth within a capitalist system. Samuelson, on the other hand,
sees the same problem as one to be addressed with the tools of dynamic programming,
which inevitably involves an embrace of the curious notion – for economics, at least –
of perfect foresight. Section 4 considers the role of mathematics in explaining this
conundrum.

9

2. Pure Consumption Loans or Saving without Investment

Shortly after the publication of his classic paper on consumption-loans,7 Samuelson
wrote to Robinson (18 May 1959): “I have been rather inundated by correspondence
concerning my JPE article.” He thanked her for her own reaction, “A Simpler Way of
Putting It”,8 noting that “a comment from you is always most welcome and I am
7

Karl Shell (1971: 1002) expressed the view of many: “Paul Samuelson’s (1958) paper

on consumption loans is to my mind one of the most original and stimulating
contributions to modern economic theory.” It has long since become standard textbook
fare (e.g. Azariadis 1993) and remains a stimulus for research (e.g. Azariadis and Smith
1993 and Azariadis and Lambertini 2003). Samuelson’s purpose, it should be recalled,
was “to give a complete general equilibrium solution to the determination of the timeshape of interest rates [associated with] a rational consumer’s lifetime consumptionsaving pattern … This sounds easy, but actually it is very hard, so hard that I shall have
to make drastic simplifications in order to arrive at exact results” (Samuelson 1958:
219).
8

There is a brief indication in an accompanying (undated) note that Robinson’s

comment had been sent to the Journal of Political Economy. The note included a
diagram, constructed with the help of Richard Kahn (as may be inferred from Kahn’s
papers in the King’s College Archives), showing lending minus borrowing and income
minus consumption as functions of the interest rate. It was not included in the final
version which appeared only in Robinson’s Collected Economic Papers under the title
“Saving Without Investment” (Robinson 1960).
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looking forward to reading it with the usual benefit and enlightenment.” At the time,
Samuelson was working on a response to Abba Lerner who “has written no less than
two comments, each revised twice and I gather that the editors have already accepted
some other comment.” That response (Samuelson 1959) to Lerner (1959), who wrote a
“Rejoinder”, and another (Samuelson 1960) to Meckling (1960), who also fired back,
were just the beginning of a burgeoning literature.

In two further exchanges, Robinson (22 May 1959) insisted that “the system requires
excess consumption by the young adults.” Samuelson (29 May 1959) answers a
different question, stating that “any pure loan scheme is very likely to produce a
negative interest rate.” This prompted Robinson (12 June 1959) to write again: “If the
young…don’t want to overspend, it won’t work,” at which point, Samuelson (30 June
1959) simply answered: “I agree with your recent statement.” This typifies the way in
which their questions and answers often seemed to elide one another. In any case,
Robinson’s main point was straightforward. Retirees (assumed to have no income)
cannot borrow because lenders know they will not be alive to honor their debts
(assumed to be zero at the end of life).9 To survive, they must have assets to liquidate
and so, as middle-aged adults in the previous period, they must be lending – but to
whom?

“The essential feature of the situation is the excess consumption of young Jones. If there
are no spendthrifts and all are determined to start saving up as soon as they begin to
9

Robinson put it this way, focusing on the late stage of working life: “An elderly man

cannot afford to borrow even at a negative rate, for he has little time left to repay and to
save up for his retirement” (Robinson 1960: 192).
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earn, there is no equilibrium and there is an indefinitely great negative rate of interest
[minus 100% per diem]…making it impossible to carry consumption forward from one
day to the next” (Robinson 1960: 192). It was this dire situation that prompted
Samuelson to ask, “Is it true, in a growing or in a stationary population, that twentyyear-olds are, in fact, overconsuming so that the middle-aged can provide for their
retirement?” (Samuelson 1958: 474). Using the simplest example, he gave a negative
answer and then proved his famous Impossibility Theorem: “[T]he social optimum
configuration can never here be reached by the competitive market, or even be
approached in ever so long a time” (ibid.: 477-478; italics in original). A further
example showed that the only meaningful and locally stable solution “implies that
consumption-loans lose about two-thirds of their principal in one period. This is here
the competitive price to avoid retirement starvation” (ibid.: 478).

Samuelson’s model “points up a fundamental and intrinsic deficiency in a free pricing
system, namely, that free pricing…by itself has no tendency to get you to positions on
the [efficiency] frontier that are ethically optimal in terms of a social welfare function;
only by social collusions – of tax, expenditure, fiat, or other type – can an ethical
observer hope to end up where he wants to be” (ibid.: 479).

In the same vein, Robinson concluded: “When conditions are such that the free market
rate of interest is heavily negative, the social insurance system seems more humane than
the consumption-loan system, and more consonant with traditional morality” (Robinson
1960: 196).

In a discursive penultimate section, “Social Contracts and the Optimum,” Samuelson
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also alluded to a social insurance system: “Once social coercion or contracting is
admitted into the picture, the present problem disappears. The reluctance of the young
to give to the old what the old can never themselves directly or indirectly repay is
overcome. Yet the young never suffer, since their successors come under the same
requirement. Everybody ends better off. It is as simple as that” (Samuelson 1958: 480).

A coercive transfer by the State is not, however, the note on which the article ends.
Rather, it is the use of Money as a Social Contrivance: “In our consumption-loan model
nothing kept. All ice melted, and so did all chocolates … There is no arguing with
Nature. But what is to stop man – or rather men – from printing oblongs of paper or
stamping circles of shell. These units of money can keep” (ibid.: 481). Robinson offers
a Keynesian caveat: “The introduction of money tokens which could be hoarded would
be disastrous unless the first generation of retired men were given a free issue”
(Robinson 1960: 195). By spending it, the retired cohort guarantees what Samuelson
then asserts: “Now the young and middle-aged do have something to hold and to carry
over into their retirement years” (Samuelson 1958: 481). He adds another condition:
“[A]s long as the new current generations of workers do not repudiate the old money,
this gives the workers of one epoch a claim on workers of a later epoch, even though no
real quid pro quo (other than money) is possible” (ibid.: 482). Thus, coercion may still
be necessary to ensure that all follow the traditional golden rule: “Do [as workers] unto
others [now retired] as [the older] you would have them [future workers] do unto [the
retired] you” (after Matthew 7:12).

Besides adhering to the rules of the game, there is a further matter of theoretical
importance – the amount of money introduced into the system must be exactly right. As
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David Gale showed, with too much money, “the model heads toward a kind of
economic collapse in which eventually people will be demanding more consumption
than the economy can provide … [Unless the issue of money is exactly right], the model
will move back away from the golden rule toward the balanced steady state” (Gale
1973: 16-17). In Gale’s terminology, a “balanced” steady state is one in which the
aggregate of assets is zero. Samuelson alludes to the problem of getting the money
injection just right at the beginning of his article: “Some interesting mathematical
boundary problems, a little like those in the modern theories of dynamic programming,
result from this analysis” (Samuelson 1958: 467). Writing to Robinson (29 May 1959),
he is a little more explicit: “[T]he pure loan system if somehow engineered into the
optimum configuration would generally be highly unstable,” as is also true of
convergent yet unstable saddle paths in neoclassical models of capital accumulation.

So-called “boundary problems” in infinite-time-horizon models received a great deal of
attention in the subsequent literature.10 Less attention was paid to Abba Lerner’s
insistence that, with either positive or negative interest, there will be less total utility
than under an optimum zero rate of interest, owing to the wedge that is driven between
marginal utilities of consumption of contemporaneous workers of various ages (young,
older, and retired, in his three-period model). Consumption and real income are the
same thing in this model. Thus, Lerner is taking the old-fashioned, radical view that
social welfare is made higher by equating marginal utilities of income across
individuals. Otherwise, “much of the good juice of utility [simply evaporates]”
(Robinson 1962b: 52).
10

For a summary of results for the consumption-loan model, see Azariadis (1993: 245-

247).
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For Lerner, the concept of a biological rate of interest equal to the growth rate of
population merely allows “the authorities [to] pretend that ‘social security’ is not a
‘socialistic’ tax and give-away program by the government but a ‘saving’ by each
worker out of his current income to provide for his old age” (Lerner 1959: 514). In a
stationary economy, the imaginary rate of interest associated with an imaginary transfer
over time just happens to equal “the zero biological rate of increase in population”
(ibid.). With a population that doubles every twenty-year period the “proportions of the
populations in the three age groups would be 4:2:1…[so that] the one-seventh of his
wage that a young worker pays grows to four-sevenths of the wage during the two
periods that elapse before he gets his pension … The true reason for this wonder is that
there are at every point of time six workers to support each pensioner. The fictitious
nature of the ‘biological’ interest stems from the impossibility, by assumption, of
transporting consumption through time in an economy where no products are durable”
(ibid.: italics in original).

Lerner elaborates, noting that: “In our society many people feel that social security by
redistribution of income by the government is alien to the pure essence of the
individualist capitalist system so that, if ‘social security’ has to be provided, it should
take the form of individual saving for old age. This has led to the belief that a social
security system cannot operate honestly unless it has acquired a fund actuarially
corresponding to the savings of all those members of society who have paid in their
contributions in the past and who will be taking them out as benefits in the future …
The essence of the matter is that the fable of the time-travel of consumption is accepted
with implicit faith by the accountants, as guardians of the private point of view … It is
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the duty of economists, as guardians of the social point of view, to explode this fairy
tale … The only real problem from the social point of view is the allocation of current
output of consumption goods between current consumers of different ages. This can
never be achieved by any kind of trading or lending, but only by a one-way
transfer…with no genuine quid pro quo” (ibid.: 516-517).

All this suggests that Samuelson (1958) may not have provided a sound social
justification for national superannuation schemes, whatever other merits the paper may
have had.11 Certainly, the myth of a “trust fund” backing US pay-as-you-go Social
Security benefits attests to the “fairy tale” nature of the scheme that Lerner was eager to
explode.

In writing to Robinson (29 May 1959), Samuelson observes that, “Lerner would
probably argue that you should see that pensions and taxes are right and not worry about
what the quid pro quo is between youthful payment and aged receipts.” He says nothing
about Lerner’s main argument concerning the fragility of a system in which the interest
rate is not effectively set equal to zero. Nor does he remind Robinson of what he saw as
the important theoretical problem motivating his analysis: “[I]n order to define an
equilibrium path of interest in a perfect capital market endowed with perfect certainty,
you have to determine all interest rates between now and the end of time; every finite
time period points beyond itself!” (Samuelson 1958: 467; italics in original). This may
explain why Robinson titled her response, “A Simpler Way of Putting It.” Samuelson
11

For further arguments along these lines, see Asimakopulos and Weldon (1968: 704,

fn. 9) who wrote: “We have found the Lerner way of looking at the problem
persuasive.”
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stays the course, replying to Lerner: “Such a dynamic problem, involving as it does the
infinity of time and the almost philosophical problems raised by the presence or absence
of ‘perfect certainty,’ is to me one of the most difficult in all economics” (Samuelson
1959: 518). The same issues – an infinite time horizon and perfect foresight – would
arise in his analysis of capital accumulation12 and, yet, in his often long letters to
Robinson, Samuelson mentions his denial of uncertainty on just two occasions (23
October 1961 and an undated communication of early 1972). There is far more candor
expressed in communications with Solow during the summer of 1973 when their
response to a draft copy of Robinson (1975a) was under intense discussion (see Section
4 below).

Samuelson returned to Lerner’s critique, which had been further analyzed and supported
by Asimakopulos (1967),13 acknowledging: “It is indeed paradoxical that the policy
which maximizes social utility in every period should, when applied to a permanently
growing exponential, results in a configuration such that every man who ever lives is
worse off. This paradox, like most paradoxes,14 arises from the infinity assumption
12

Samuelson (1958), it may be noted, is reprinted under “The Pure Theory of Capital

and Growth” in his Collected Scientific Papers, rather than in the sections concerned
with consumption theory.
13

Cited by Samuelson (1967a: 280), this paper was written in 1966 (see Asimakopulos

1967: 189).
14

Remarkably, Samuelson acknowledges that, “Up to any instant of time, the L-A

[Lerner-Asimakopulos] state has produced more social utility than the S-D [SamuelsonDiamond] state. And departing from an ever-held S-D state in favor of an L-A state
leads to an increase in social utility in every subsequent period” (Samuelson 1967a: 270,
17

involved … Lerner presumably would bypass the pitfalls of divergent geometric series
by insisting that the assumption of a permanently growing exponential is an absurd and
monstrous one, involving a Ponzi-game or chain-letter swindle. If golden-age
assumptions are successfully ruled out by Lerner as monstrous, he will in one swoop
kill off a sizable fraction of the modern growth-theory literature” (Samuelson 1967a:
270).15

3. Capital Theory and Income Distribution

Samuelson’s correspondence with Robinson on matters relating to capital theory and
income distribution began about ten years after their first exchange of letters following
the death of Keynes. Samuelson repeatedly made three points. First, the mathematical
theory of dynamic optimization is the proper foundation for a theory of capital
accumulation, the pricing of capital goods, and the determination of the spectrum of
own rates of interest. Second, constant returns to scale leaves indeterminate the number
of transactions in final goods taking place between owners of various produced and
non-produced inputs. Third, reduced consumption at a point in time causes a subsequent
outward shift in production possibilities, under conditions of near enough full
fn. 2; italics in original).
15

Samuelson went on to out-do Lerner-Asimakopulos by proving a Catenary Turnpike

Theorem. The most efficient path to a welfare-maximizing golden-rule equilibrium at
some finite future date entails just such over-accumulation of capital as to bring the rate
of interest down to zero for most of the path: “The optimum…presupposes direct
intervention by the state to redistribute consumption by lump-sum taxation” (Samuelson
1967a: 279).
18

employment.

i. Dynamic Optimization as the Foundation for Capital Theory

Robinson (22 January 1958) thought the assumptions she discerned in Samuelson’s
“piece on Marx” (Samuelson 1957) were “very unnatural” and wrote that he had merely
“escaped[d] the puzzles connected with measuring capital” by making the length of life
of all capital goods “uniform and very short.” Samuelson (3 February 1958) answered
the charge by referring to his work on dynamic optimization, eschewing any concern
with the value of capital as a whole:

I avoided all puzzles connected with the measurement of capital…by specifying a
complete (albeit simple) technological model. The world never grapples with the
problem of reducing capital to a homogeneous measure: it uses complicated vectors of
inputs to produce complicated vectors of output … [I]n the November 1956 QJE Solow
and I showed how any number of heterogeneous capital goods are to be handled; and
also in our Dorfman-Samuelson-Solow book LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1958), of which I’ve sent Richard Kahn a copy.

Without taking a stance “on the question as to whether it was natural or unnatural to
consider a model in which…the system remains not too far from full employment,”
Samuelson made his objective clear: “I do consider it a highly interesting problem to
analyze the probable pattern of goods and factor pricing of a model in which activist
fiscal and monetary policies did succeed in keeping chronic unemployment from being
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large and growing.”16

Following Robinson’s 1961 visit to MIT, Samuelson (10 October 1961) again writes:
“The MIT School view that I have always adhered to maintains that one has to work
with vectors of heterogeneous physical capital goods and time-consuming processes –
that use of a homogeneous capital stuff is never necessary even though the parable17
16

Citing Meade (1961), Hahn (1966: 646) also suggests that the assumed success of

Keynesian demand management policies is an “alternative interpretation” of a
competitive equilibrium growth path under conditions of full employment.
17

When the “parable” was published, Samuelson expressed his gratitude to Pierangelo

Garegnani “for saving me from asserting the false conjecture that my extreme
assumption of equi-proportional inputs in the consumption and machine trades could be
lightened and still leave one with many of the surrogate propositions” (Samuelson 1962:
202, fn. 1). See also Asimakopulos and Harcourt (1974: 483), where it is pointed out
that, “If there are many techniques, the differences in the value of output per head and
the value of capital per man between adjacent points may be very small … These small
differences in value may mask substantial differences in the types and composition of
capital goods in each system. Hence, if an attempt were made to move from one longperiod equilibrium position to another, much more than a marginal change in the capital
goods would be required. The existing equilibrium would be ruptured, and there is no
guarantee that the behavior of the individual decision-makers in the economy would be
such as to enable the transition to the new equilibrium position to be made.” Robinson
put it this way: “[T]he machines…may be completely different for each [technique] …
[so that to] ‘change’ the technique in use…it would be necessary…to go back into the
past and rewrite the history of the investment” (Robinson 1975a: 34, 53). Rewriting
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may have some useful pedagogical functions.” He concludes on a somewhat patronizing
note: “I do not enclose a copy of the Dorfman-Samuelson-Solow book showing how
programming handles such diverse vectors of goods because no one can be expected to
read so big a book.”

The determining role of “existent supplies of physical capital goods” (23 October 1961)
is repeatedly emphasized, in opposition to the aggregate value of capital (3 May 1965;
13 August 1965; 5 May 1967). Answering Robinson’s query (14 October 1971)
concerning the difference between “what Marx called ‘prices of production’…[and]
what you now propose to call Walrasian prices based on supply and demand for scarce
means with alternative uses,” Samuelson wrote in the same vein:

[I]n the DOSSO book [an acronym for Dorfman et al. (1958)], if you look carefully,
you will find examples of complete, logically non-contradictory models in which
heterogeneous capital-goods’ pricing and interest rate determinations are defined over
time. Whether these models are realistic or even interesting depends on the eyes of the
reader.

He maintained this position – with its hint of ambivalence – throughout their
correspondence, adopting Harrod’s terminology (23 April 1973) when he wrote of “the
optimal-programming rules for describing accurately a warrantable dynamic
accumulation process from one steady state to another.” Samuelson was no doubt aware
that a non-mathematically trained economist would be unable to follow the argument in
Samuelson and Solow (1956), which forms the basis for chapters 11 and 12 of DOSSO.
history is her way of ensuring equilibrium, but not, of course, Samuelson’s.
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However, neither the paper nor the book is entirely mathematical. There is, for example,
a half-page of interpretation in DOSSO at the end of a section entitled Competitive
Markets and Dynamic Efficiency:

The truly remarkable thing about the intertemporal invisible hand is that while it results
in efficiency over long periods of time, it requires only the most myopic vision on the
part of market participants. Just current [equilibrium] prices and [their] current rates of
change need to be known, and at each moment long-run efficiency is preserved. But for
society as a whole there is need for vision at a distance (Dorfman et al. 1958: 321).

Had Samuelson drawn attention to these few lines in his correspondence with Robinson,
she would surely have pressed him to explain what society’s “need for vision at a
distance” actually entailed. The authors of DOSSO are clear on this; namely, setting the
initial price of each capital good exactly right so that the equilibrium trajectory of
accumulation will follow a convergent saddle path,18 or, in language that Robinson
would have understood, a knife-edge. Samuelson nowhere acknowledges a connection
between this formal problem – the problem of ensuring that transversality conditions
are satisfied – and the literary arguments set forth in Robinson (1953-1954) concerning
the problem of reconciling past, present, and future valuations of capital. Robinson
(1959) clarified the issues from a Keynesian perspective (part of her effort to extend
Keynesian analysis of effective demand to the long period). Samuelson, in contrast,
acknowledges no formal connection between dynamic optimization and Keynesian
18

In Dorfman et al. (1958: 321), capital-good prices at some terminal date must be set

precisely – hence the “need for vision at a distance”, but a footnote states that setting
initial prices correctly will do just as well.
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analysis. He simply assumes that fiscal and monetary policy actions – Keynesian
aggregate demand policies – always succeed in keeping the economic system operating
at (or near enough to) a point on its production possibility frontier, a standard
assumption of neoclassical capital theory (see Solow 1956: 91-94 and Swan 1956:
335).19

In their correspondence, Samuelson often tells Robinson how much he has learned from
her published work, but on the matter of making clear the role of perfect foresight in his
own theory, he is less than candid.20 She addressed the issue directly in a response to
Samuelson’s suggestion (27 May 1964) that she write an essay on the question:

What difference does it make for the behavior of a mixed economy if its book of
technological blue prints has a great many pages of slightly varied technical
opportunities…as compared to an economy whose technology has great ‘gaps’ and
which has choice only of a limited number of fixed coefficient alternatives?

Robinson answered (1 June 1964; italics added):

19

For extensive commentary on the differences between the growth models of Solow

and Swan, see Pitchford (2002) and Dimand and Spencer (2009).
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Solow does not mince his words: “[T]he real difficulty…comes not from the physical

diversity of capital goods. It comes from the intertwining of past, present and future,
from the fact that while there is something foolish about a theory of capital built on the
assumption of perfect foresight, we have no equally precise and definite assumption to
take its place” (Solow 1955-1956: 102).
23

[S]o long as we are concerned with the positions of equilibrium where each economy
has become adjusted to its own rate of interest with correct foresight, it does not make
the smallest difference to the argument how large or small are the steps in the book of
blue-prints. What is important is the actual collection of physical capital goods,
knowledge and qualities of labor produced by the past history in which there has not
been correct foresight or a single book of blue-prints. The response of the economy to
monetary policy and questions of that kind depend upon this short-period situation.

As for eschewing the importance of “reducing capital to a homogeneous measure” (22
January 1958), it is curious that Samuelson also fails to alert Robinson to a point that he
and his co-authors had made:

One interesting sidelight before we leave the subject of intertemporal pricing: Consider
any efficient capital program and its corresponding profile of prices and own-rates [of
change of prices]. At every point of time the value of the capital stock at current
efficiency prices, discounted back to the initial time, is a constant, equal to the initial
value. This law of conservation of discounted value of capital (or discounted Net
National Product) reflects, as do the grand laws of conservation of energy in physics,
the maximizing nature of the path (Dorfman et al. 1958: 321-222; italics in original).

An interest in “Conservations Laws” marks his later research,21 and yet Samuelson
21

Samuelson (1990) proves a theorem on the constancy of the capital-output ratio along

an optimal path, where both prices and quantities of capital goods are changing
continuously, i.e. along a non-steady state path of accumulation. He then asks, recalling
Robinson’s arguments: “Will these neoclassical results hold for a neo-classical model of
24

granted no importance to the “conservation” of aggregate capital value in Dorfman et al.
(1958) or elsewhere. He simply responded (3 May 1965) to Robinson’s question
concerning the relationship between the aggregate capital output ratio and the interest
rate by saying: “As soon as one leaves the simplest model, we need a general
equilibrium approach in which everything depends upon everything else (but in a
virtuously-Walrasian way and not in a viciously-circular way). The system cares
nothing for aggregative totals and few invariant relations can be found for them.” The
exception, for “even the most complicated set of blueprints” is that “if intrinsic jointproducts…are ruled out, it remains true that: ‘The higher the interest rate 𝑟 the lower the
real wage expressed in terms of any (and hence every) consumption good.’”

Interpretive passages in other published work reinforce the view that Samuelson might
well have met Robinson on her own ground, but, for whatever reason, did not do so. A
clear case arises in connection with one of two articles Samuelson published in the 1967
volume edited by Karl Shell entitled Essays on the Theory of Optimal Economic
Growth. Under the heading, “Re-aiming Behavior of Speculators”, Samuelson sets
forth, with striking imagery, his own misgivings concerning the “MIT School view that
Joan Robinson type, where marginal productivities in the form of partial derivatives are
not definable because only a finite number of activities are technologically possible?”
(ibid.: 58). His affirmative answer is qualified, and so “this law is not trivially true … I
conclude that, at best, if discrete-time intervals can be taken so small that there is little
error in approximating the system by a continuous-time model, we can hope to state an
‘almost-constancy’ of the capital-output ratio along any optimal path” (ibid.: 69).
Champernowne (1953-1954) had also faced the problem of dealing with discrete versus
smooth changes.
25

[he had] always adhered to”:22

My analysis…has confirmed Hahn’s finding23 that merely to postulate over-all saving
propensities leaves a heterogeneous system indeterminate in its development … Now
how do actual economic systems resolve these indeterminacies? … The image in my
mind is that of a bicycle. The rider of the bicycle is the bulk of the market, a somewhat
mystical concept to be sure – like its analogue, the well-informed speculator who gets
his way in the end because his way is the correctly discerned way of the future … Even
22

A belief in the stabilizing role of speculators – neither backed up by an argument nor

questioned in the way that Keynes (1936) [1973] and Kaldor (1939) had done – informs
Samuelson’s other published work with Solow: “This re-aiming is, so to speak, what an
optimizing society is constantly doing” (Samuelson and Solow 1956: 548). How such
“re-aiming” occurs and what damage is done before the ship is righted are, of course,
the fundamental questions that Robinson wanted to discuss.
23

The issues raised by Hahn recall the theoretical stance taken by Irving Fisher: “When

prices find their normal level at which costs plus interest are covered, it is not because
the past costs of production have determined prices in advance, but because the sellers
have been good speculators as to what prices would be” (Fisher 1906: 188). “Thus
Fisher shifted all economic reasoning to the future … It was a complete reversal of the
classical causation, as Fisher himself put it” (Bharadwaj 1985: 18). Hahn found in this
reversal a profound problem: “The fact that the description of the present involves the
future in an essential way must bear the responsibility for the unsatisfactory behavior of
the equilibrium path” (Hahn 1966: 645-646). Samuelson quickly realized the
importance of Hahn’s argument, but nowhere is it mentioned in his correspondence with
Robinson.
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if there is something valid in this heuristic reasoning, one must admit that the system
need not – and, generally, will not – move from its present position to the golden age in
the most efficient way: it will hare after false goals, get detoured, and begin to be
corrected only after it has erred … One feels that the real world of tools, plant, and
inventory contrasts with the purely financial dream world of indefinite group selffulfillment. But can this feeling be given documentation and plausible explication?
(Samuelson 1967b: 228-230).

The pages from which this passage is taken – had they been sent to his sparring partner
– might have opened up a more fruitful dialogue. Obfuscation may actually have been a
strategy, however, as suggested in a letter to Solow (19 July 1973):24

[W]hen we face up to heterogeneous capital goods, we do get into terrific problems of
needed foresight (and indeed the ‘Hahn’ problem of how to cut the indeterminacy of the
detailed composition of capital goods within the aggregate saving-investment budget set
by baby-simple class propensities to save). Of course, Joan can’t understand, or at least
never keeps in mind for as long as 30 seconds running, that there is a logical way of
defining warrantable dynamic paths that are not balanced exponentials (sometimes for a
socialist planned society she concedes a little) … And think how horribly difficult it
would be to get this into a reasoned discussion of the so-called Two Cambridges issues
24

In an addendum to an earlier letter (9 July 1973), Samuelson provides Solow with a

list of eleven points he is considering in connection with a response to Robinson. There,
he states categorically: “I doubt that she understands what a price-quantities warranted
dynamic path is or that it is logically possible – albeit not always [if ever] realized in
real life.” The eleven points, plus two more, are found in Samuelson (1976).
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… Perhaps never admit anything and claim everything?

Certainly, Samuelson alludes to assumptions that he knows are unacceptable to
Robinson, but they are not spelled out in his letters to her. Earlier (10 October 1961), he
had written:

One of the few apparent differences that still remain is that I think the study of
transition states is not a hopeless one for the economic theorist. I am prepared to make
certain assumptions about uncertainty and expectations in the presence of fast and slow
changes that you will think useless assumptions; I expect some little light to be reflected
on such transient dynamic states by the study of stationary states, and I understand you
to be more skeptical in this regard. I think we can hope to make some slow progress
toward understanding the behavior of an economy undergoing technological change by
first isolating some of the properties of a system that undergoes no technical change. In
all this I may be wrong, and time may tell.

It is rather in his correspondence with Solow concerning the draft of Robinson (1975a)
where one finds (19 July 1973) a clear statement of Samuelson’s position on the
relationship between equilibrium theory and the market process:

What you and I realize is that it is a tough problem for a market economy to have all the
perfect futures markets that are needed for Arrow-Debreu optimal dynamic paths. Yet,
when you review the Pareto-Mises-Lerner-Lange-Hayek debates about socialism versus
capitalism, one realizes that Hayek’s point about the need to mobilize and utilize
imperfect information actually wins the debate: no planning algorithm or computer can
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come anywhere close to approximating intertemporally-efficient paths, whereas the
market (helped by the Justice Department and bankruptcy) makes a workably-adequate
pass at the problem.

It is hard to countenance the suggestion at the beginning of this passage that lessor
mortals – including Robinson – are quite unable to appreciate the fact that
intertemporally-efficient paths entail a set of perfect futures markets. As for allusions to
actions by the Justice Department and to bankruptcy, these bring into question the
whole theoretical argument, yet Robinson was never brought into Samuelson’s
confidence on this fundamental caveat.

ii. Constant Returns to Scale Eliminates the Need for Transactions in Final Goods

On the theoretical implications of constant returns to scale, Samuelson (28 January
1972) wrote to Robinson:

For 70 years at least students of Wicksell have realized that in a world of constant
returns to scale, there is no need for exchange of final goods. I see no contradiction to
that in the view of Smith, Ricardo, Sraffa and me that the equilibrium price ratio of
goods readily reproducible at constant costs (and produced in positive amounts) is their
cost ratio, without regard to the number of transactions that take place at that
equilibrium ratio.

Samuelson was referring to Knut Wicksell’s Lectures on Political Economy, in
particular, “The Landowner as Entrepreneur,” and “The Labourer (or a Third Party) as
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Entrepreneur,” which, it should be noted, fall under the heading “Non-capitalist
Production” (Wicksell (1934) [1977]: 110-133). Samuelson (1953-1954) had also
granted the indeterminate organization of production under constant returns to scale,
arguing that it is immaterial which “factor” hires the other(s):

Throughout I make the simplifying assumption most appropriate for viable perfect
competition – namely constant-returns-to-scale…; under this strict assumption the
composition of industry output among firms becomes indeterminate and of no
importance, so that the factors can be thought of as hiring each other in a Darwinian
process of ruthless natural selection which severely punishes any momentary deviation
from the statical optimum … [T]he same results would follow if I supposed, with
Leontief and others, that each good requires in its production every other good as an
input. Goods would then have a double function – as inputs as well as outputs, as
intermediate as well as final goods. Moreover, the only way to characterise a ‘primary
factor’ in such a system would be by the fact that it cannot be produced and reproduced
by a homogeneous production function (ibid.: 1; italics in original).

Constant returns to scale is, for Samuelson, theoretically tractable rather than
empirically justified, as is clear from his further remarks about additivity:25

Alternative hypothesis: We can always independently carry on production in two
separate processes and there will not be any necessary ‘external’ inter-action between
these processes that prevents us from getting as a total the sum of their separate outputs.
25

“Conservation Laws,” too, require the assumption of constant returns to scale (see

Samuelson 1990).
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Like the assumption of constant-returns-to-scale this is an empirical hypothesis rather
than a truism; not only are both of these hypotheses conceptually refutable, but in
addition there is considerable empirical evidence, in connection with technology and the
breakdown of perfect competition, that in large realms of economic life these are poor
hypotheses to make (ibid.: 2).

In other communications as well, Samuelson had already gone to considerable lengths
to insist that, under constant returns to scale, no transactions are strictly required. He
sent Robinson (3 April 1971) a numerical example of an economy using coal and corn
to produce coal and corn. In a familiar notation, the price equations (not given by
Samuelson) are:
(. 5𝑝2 + 2𝑤)(1 + 𝑟) = 𝑝1
(. 5𝑝1 + 2𝑤)(1 + 𝑟) = 𝑝2
Neither good is a direct requirement in its own production, but both are basic in the
sense of Sraffa. The wage is paid at the beginning of the production period. Samuelson
sets the steady-state rate of profit at 50% to obtain a real wage of 1/12 in terms of either
good, and a relative price of 1. Each price is $12, given a $1 nominal wage. Quantity
equations (also not given) are:
𝑋1 = .5𝑋2 (1 + 𝑔) + 𝐶1
𝑋2 = .5𝑋1 (1 + 𝑔) + 𝐶2
2𝑋1 + 2𝑋2 = 1,200
There are 100 workers, each providing 12 hours of work per day; the growth rate is
zero. Gross outputs are set equal: 𝑋1 = 300 = 𝑋2, so that the gross value in each sector
is $3,600, for a total of $7,200. Workers spend their whole $1,200 income on corn, for a
total of 100 units, or 1 for each worker. Circulating capital is replaced using 150 units of
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each good, accounting for $1,800 of each sector’s output. This leaves $600 worth of
corn (50 units) and $1,800 worth of coal (150 units) for consumption. Samuelson
assumes that capitalists spend their profit in such a way as to create an equilibrium of
supply and demand. As a check, profit income is $1,200 in each sector for a total of
$2,400 (50% of the sum of the value of circulating capital plus the wage bill). In terms
of corn this is 200 units. In equilibrium, one-quarter of profit must be spent on corn (the
above 50-unit residual). In terms of coal, total profit is also 200 units. In equilibrium,
three-quarters must be spent on coal (the above 150-unit residual). These are the
fractions in Samuelson’s example.

Samuelson posits a no-transactions “island of feudalism” headed by one (of ten)
capitalists who “uses 10 workers 12 hours a day” to produce outputs for replacement of
used-up corn and coal, as well as consumption for himself and his workers, exactly
equal to 1/10 of the steady-state quantities already set forth. (No mention is made of the
fact that the capitalist also needs 15 units of coal and 15 units of corn to produce 30 of
each good, plus enough corn to pay wages “at the beginning of the period.” Simply
having 120 worker-hours at his disposal is not enough to operate in isolation from other
capitalists, whether or not corn-wages are paid in advance.) Samuelson then remarks
that, “If the rest of society used competitive capitalist exchange, this island of feudalism
could not be tempted out of its isolation by economic advantage.” His main point,
however, concerns the alternative arrangement in which “workers want the illusion of
autonomy.” Now, ten workers form a “cooperative or kibbutz.” To get going, “They
find a rentier-capitalist and strike an arms-length bargain or social contract with him
once and for all in the year 1066: he gives them 15 initial corn (plus corn subsistence)
and 15 initial coal, in return for their remitting forever 15 coal per period plus 5 corn per
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period.” Nothing has really changed, for, “As Wicksell put the matter so long ago, once
interesting matters of uncertainty, change, and deviations from constant returns to scale
are idealized away, the perfect competition that remains is indifferent as to which
factors ‘hire’ the others.” Importantly, there is no acknowledgement that Wicksell’s
argument concerned non-capitalist production or that, when Wicksell does take up
capitalist production, he does not repeat or refer to the argument set forth earlier.26

Robinson’s reaction (11 April 1972) is brief, reflecting her view that economic theory
ought to recognize an essential difference between various systems of prices – in
particular, Walrasian versus Sraffian (see Robinson 1962a: 1-21). In their
correspondence, she repeatedly asks Samuelson for his theory of the rate of profit; and,
in this letter, asks: “What determines the rate of interest when workers hire inputs from
26

Samuelson also ignored Wicksell’s remarks on capital as a factor of production:

“Whereas labour and land are measured each in terms of its own technical unit (e.g.
working days or months, acre per annum), capital, on the other hand, as we have already
shown, is reckoned, in common parlance, as a sum of exchange value – whether in
money or as an average of products. In other words, each particular capital good is
measured by a unit extraneous to itself. However good the practical reasons for this may
be, it is a theoretical anomaly which disturbs the correspondence which would
otherwise exist between all factors of production ... If capital also were to be measured
in technical units, the defect would be remedied and the correspondence would be
complete. But, in that case, productive capital would have to be distributed into as many
categories as there are kinds of tools, machinery, and materials etc., and a unified
treatment of the role of capital would be impossible” (Wicksell (1934) [1977]: 149,
cited by Eatwell 2012: 5, fn. 3).
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capitalist-rentiers and why do they pay in perpetuity for an advance made in 1066?” In
the example, the rate of profit (interest) is simply given, and the assumption of perpetual
payments eases the calculation of implied capitalized values of the associated income
streams. In this exchange, neither protagonist dwells on the implicit assumption of
perfect foresight of those income streams.

Samuelson then addresses (14 April 1972) what he likely regarded as the underlying
political problem at the heart of Robinson’s queries:

There is no disagreement that, in a stationary state with only one page-of-blue-print
technology which has long been giving to workers only a fraction of the total net
product, an act of political expropriation that gave the workers collectively ownership in
the raw materials would successfully result in euthanasia of the capitalist class. But
Allende will of course face a more complicated model.27
27

Samuelson wrote in the same vein to Solow in his letter of 19 July 1973:

“[R]eswitching and backward switching and all the important things that are possible in
n-vector models but not in 1-vector models, do not provide a powerful test or refutation
of ‘marginal-productivity income determination’ or of what is even more basic of the
fundamental insight that supplies of capital goods, relative to unproducible labor, do
importantly affect the pricing of the owned factors of production and the marketimputed income of property-less laborers in comparison with propertied people. This is
the basic denial of Robinson, Kaldor, Pasinetti, etc. Only if they assume their overlysimple models – fixed capital/output ratio, etc. – do they get the indeterminacies that
leave a way for simple power acts by unions to drastically alter distribution and the
indeterminacies that can be filled in only by macroeconomic tautologies of the Kalecki34

[In cases] with many pages of technology, a once and for all expropriation which was
shared equally by all workers might well, if each worker was subsequently permitted to
sell off his share of intermediate goods, result after a time in unequal ownership as
between the more- and less-thrifty and the lucky or unlucky … If the system ever comes
into a new steady state – which I would regard as doubtful – it could be one again with
positive profit rate (not necessarily unique) just high enough and just low enough so that
the capitalized market value of non-labor resources averaged over people of all ages
(the retired dissavers and working savers) would work out to equality with their cost of
production total values. In short, Modigliani’s life-cycle model of saving provides one
possible way of finding the missing equation [for the profit rate]. But there are others.

A final, undated letter28 on this topic begins, as in the above numerical example, by
assuming that “the rate of profit is (provisionally) taken as given.” Samuelson reviews
his “non-substitution theorem” (steady-state prices of final goods independent of the
composition of final demand), emphasizing its dependence on the special assumption of
a single non-produced input. With more than one such input, increasing opportunity
cost immediately comes into play so that relative prices under competition do generally
depend on the composition of final demand. However, the main thrust of the letter is to
argue that in all cases where constant returns to scale prevail, there is “no occasion or
Robinson-Kaldor type.” See Asimakopulos (1975, 1980-1981) for a discussion of how
accounting identities – presumably what Samuelson was referring to as “tautologies” –
provide a starting point for non-tautological macroeconomic theories of distribution.
28

The date is likely March or April 1972, as Samuelson is responding to a point that

Robinson had made (15 March 1972) about labor-value prices in Smith.
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necessity to trade” final goods, “since anyone can use his ownership of primary factors
and of intermediate goods to hire all that is needed to produce the final goods.”
Regardless of the technological assumptions made, “what must be said is that, after a
single initial exchange, ever after in the steady state each of us can exchange only
primary factors against primary factors and can produce all of our unchanging final
goods for ourselves.” A footnote repeats a point made in connection with the numerical
example, adding that “this initial exchange would consist of borrowing the wherewithal
to buy the intermediate goods you will need forever, paying interest out of your gross
sales; in exponential growth, a new act of borrowing will be needed to finance each
increment of output reached for the rest of time thereafter.” Finally, a brief answer is
given to Robinson’s repeated query on what determines Samuelson’s “provisionally”
given rate of profit:29

To understand how the competitive rate of profit gets set under these conditions,
29

This is very much like the “provisional” assumption, in static theory, that relative

prices are given. First, one works out what the value-maximizing composition of output
would be; then, what the utility maximizing composition of demand would be, in light
of the factor prices (and therefore the distribution of income, given factor ownership)
implied by the given relative prices, assuming there is a unique answer. If they match,
the “provisionally” given relative prices are equilibrium prices. If not, one tries again.
Where no solution algorithm is known, i.e. in most cases of any degree of complexity,
fixed-point theorems can establish existence, but not necessarily uniqueness. There may
be multiple, isolated solutions or even a continuum (when a changing distribution of
income just happens to leave the composition of final demand unchanged at the point
where the value of output is maximized).
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whether high or low, one must weigh the conditions of supply that make intermediate
goods available in plenitude or scarcitude [sic] as against the motivated commercial
demand for them. The capitalists, like the landlords, have something the workers
haven’t got; the workers have something the others don’t have, etc.

A generalized theory of supply and demand was always in the back of Samuelson’s
mind. Robinson, in contrast, insisted on distinguishing among various systems of prices,
on one occasion (15 March 1972) setting forth a tripartite division, altered somewhat
when later published (Robinson 1973). Robinson had written to Samuelson, “The
important thing is to get the question clear before trying to answer it. Three cases have
been mixed up in this correspondence.” She then set forth her distinctions:

(1) “Scarce means with alternative uses…, fixed amounts of specific factors and a
production possibility frontier”; (2) “Sraffa. The composition of output is whatever it is.
There is a single complex technique. Inputs in use, all produced within the system, are
those appropriate to the technique and the composition of output; (3) “Beavers and deer
[a reference to Smith]. There are constant returns for each separately in the sense that
output per man hour is independent of the amount of labour engaged. If, furthermore,
labour is interchangeable between occupations and divisible, there is no occasion to
trade. Therefore, I say that Adam Smith was wrong in saying that trade takes place at
labour value prices. On the other hand, if each kind of labour is fully specialized to its
own product, there is no general unit of labour … If trade takes place, prices must be
influenced by supply and demand.

There was no essential point of contention concerning Smith’s deer and beavers,
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although Samuelson insisted that if trade did take place, it would have to be at labor
value prices, otherwise, “infinite arbitrage trade would be set into motion.” Presumably,
he also would have had no quarrel with Robinson’s allusion, in the case of specialized
types of labor, to his own comment on the role in trade of specifically localized factors
of production: “We would be giving the show away if we were to descend to such
fatuities as: the tropics grow tropical fruits because of the relative abundance there of
tropical conditions” (Samuelson 1948: 182).

In her published list of model-types, Robinson insisted that, in the case of scarce means
with alternative uses, “there are ‘rentals’ for particular physical ‘factors of production’
but no overall rate of profit. This is the basis of Walras’ general equilibrium” (Robinson
1973: 1,367; italics added). She is here making no allowance for the possibility that
particular physical factors of production may be reproducible, as in the world of Sraffa,
where such inputs have prices, as outputs of the system, but no explicit rental rates for
their services. It is in this world of production of commodities by means of commodities
where one can find an overall rate of profit under conditions of competition, the starting
point for an analysis of capitalism, which can then be modified to account for elements
of monopoly power, among other complications to the basic model.30

Rental markets for the services of capital goods may, in fact, be thin or non-existent,
but, for Samuelson, rental rates are always defined, if not observable, as implicit shadow
prices. Each such rate, 𝑅𝑖 , together with the price of the corresponding capital good, 𝑃𝑖 ,
30

See, for example, chapters 11 and 12 of Kurz and Salvadori (1995). An extensive

discussion and critique of the classical “law of a uniform tendency in the rate of profit”
is found in Harris (1988).
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and its time derivative, 𝑃̇𝑖 , defines an own rate of return, net of (for simplicity,
exponential) depreciation, 𝛿𝑖 . All rates rate of return are equalized under competition
across the whole spectrum of capital goods:31
𝑅𝑖 ⁄𝑃𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖̇ ⁄𝑃𝑖 − 𝛿𝑖 = 𝑅𝑗 ⁄𝑃𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗̇ ⁄𝑃𝑗 − 𝛿𝑗 = 𝑅𝑘 ⁄𝑃𝑘 + 𝑃̇𝑘 ⁄𝑃𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘 = ⋯
In short, where Robinson sees a basic difference between Walrasian and Sraffian prices
– the former involving rental rates for scarce factor services along a production
possibility frontier, the latter involving a uniform competitive rate of profits –
Samuelson sees none. For him, only the special case of constant relative prices yields a
simple proportional link between rental rates and prices: 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑟𝑃𝑖 for all 𝑖, where 𝑟 is
the rate of profit (interest) in a steady state.

Constant returns to scale is central to Samuelson’s understanding of Sraffa, but not, it
31

See Bruno (1969: 49), where the common value of such rates of return is the growth

rate of the labor force plus the rate at which future consumption is discounted, both in
and out of steady-state equilibrium. In a footnote, Bruno states that, “an optimal growth
model avoids some of the ‘causal indeterminacy’ problems recently raised by Hahn
(1966).” Recent work undermines this optimism: “From the outset, it is admitted that, in
all the models considered, the path of prices and quantities is, from the point of view of
market adjustment, dynamically highly unstable – namely saddle-path stable”
(Burgstaller 1994: 38). See also Gram (1996) and Burgstaller (2001). As for Robinson,
Samuelson’s remark to Solow (9 July 1973), doubting that she understood “what a
price-quantities warranted dynamic path is,” may not be quite fair. Referring to
intertemporal equilibrium theory, she wrote: “[F]or my part, I have never been able to
make that theory stand up long enough to knock it down” (Robinson 1980a: 128), an apt
quip, in view of the knife-edge property of a convergent saddle path.
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would seem, to Robinson’s. Following Sraffa, she takes both the technique and the
composition of output as given when referring to a Sraffian price system.32 Sraffa
himself equivocated on the role of returns to scale: “If [the assumption of constant
returns in all industries] is found helpful, there is no harm in the reader’s adopting it as a
temporary working hypothesis. In fact, no such assumption is made” (Sraffa 1960: v).
In correspondence, Samuelson did not engage Robinson on the essential/inessential role
of constant returns to scale in Sraffa (ibid.). Yet, in his published work, he is adamant:
“In sum, if a Sraffian denies constant returns to scale, the one-hundred-page 1960
classic evaporates into a few paragraphs of vapid chit-chat” (Samuelson 2000: 123). In
“Sraffian economics” for The New Palgrave, he expressed the same viewpoint:

Although Sraffa reserved judgment for half a century on whether he wanted to assume
constant returns to scale, experiments with returns laws that depart from that property
will be found to rob his algebra of any interesting economic applications, as the paucity
of results on this point in the literature of the last quarter of a century attest (Samuelson
1987: 455).

32

As noted in the Introduction, Samuelson had asked Robinson if, when Sraffa wrote

“constant returns,” he meant “to scale.” It becomes clear (28 February 1972) that
Samuelson took it to mean constant opportunity cost, i.e. a linear production possibility
frontier, in contrast to “more general models.” Robinson (1 February 1972), for her part,
widened the question: “I do not know whether ‘scale’ applies to a plant, a firm, or an
industry. I assume you mean the total output of a specified commodity, but then are you
discussing a change in the composition of output or an increase in total output?” She
reiterates her position that “there are two distinct kinds of prices.”
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This indictment has not gone unchallenged. Dependence of prices and the wage on both
outputs and the rate of profit in a Sraffian system is recognized, formally, as a
“correspondence…not yet fully explored” (Kurz and Salvadori (2000: 154), responding
to Samuelson (2000)). More generally, this dependence is seen as an essential part of a
reconstructed modern classical theory consisting of:

[A] union of theories – theories of output, of accumulation, of technical development, of
the real wage, and so on – from which the data of the theory of value are derived. A
great strength of the classical framework derives from this separation between the
determination of output and the theory of value. Not only does this separation free us
from the need to assume constant returns, but also it embodies great potential for
theoretical development. For example, the direct integration of the classical theory of
value with Keynesian principles of effective demand presents none of the difficulties
encountered in attempts to establish a relationship between the neoclassical theory of
value, in which values and the employment of factors are determined simultaneously,
and Keynesian analysis (Eatwell 1977: 66; see also Eatwell 2012).

A “paucity of results” from Samuelson’s vantage point is, at least for other students of
Sraffa (1960), a potential not yet fully explored, a lacuna with rich and generative
possibilities for the development of a classical theory of competition (see Harris 1988).
In any case, reading Robinson (1956, 1962a) as a systematic effort to integrate the
classical theory of value with Keynesian principles of effective demand is surely a more
promising point of departure than one that holds her magnum opus up to the formal
standards of intertemporal equilibrium analysis under perfect foresight, which, for
Robinson, pulled the rug out from under any realistic analysis of capitalism.
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iii. Reduced Consumption Increases Future Production Possibilities

Towards the end of The General Theory, Keynes remarked, “[I]f our central controls
succeed in establishing an aggregate volume of output corresponding to full
employment as nearly as is practicable, the classical theory comes into its own again
from this point onwards” (Keynes (1936) [1973]: 378). A door had opened to the
development of what Robinson saw as a backward step: pre-Keynesian theory after
Keynes. Thus, in the wake of Robinson’s “memorable visit” to MIT, Samuelson wrote
to her (10 October 1961), arguing, in effect, that the presumption of successful
aggregate demand policies justified an intertemporal equilibrium analysis based on such
traditional concepts as the production possibility frontier:

But I assure you that whatever my delight in abstract models for their own sake, I have
always in the front of my mind such important real questions as this: If by private thrift
or Kennedy-overbalancing-of-the-budget-coupled-with-successful-expansionary-creditpolicies a mixed economy succeeds in lowering the fraction that consumption is to its
full employment income, how much will its future production possibilities improve as
against what would be expected to happen under other policies (italics added).

Later in the same month (23 October 1961), the connection between a change in the
time profile of consumption and the average level of interest rates is referred to in a
general way:

[T]he rate at which the society is willing to consume below its potential in the interest

42

of physical net capital formations could (as could any demand-composition factors)
affect the average level and spread of (own) interest rates. You will realize that I do not
mention the interest rate (or the profit rate) because in the regime I speak of there is no
necessary equilibrium stationary over time which keeps relative prices the same and
thereby turns the complex of own rates of interest into a single rate.

He then “throw[s] in a bonus” on the overall direction in which interest rates will move:

[A]ny society which stints itself in consumption goods, making sure that no Keynesian
abortions of ‘saving’ result from induced unemployments [sic], can be expected to (1)
increase its future production possibilities and (2) to lower the general position of its
structure of own interest rates and (3) to find itself more easily in a position to swing
into a new low-profit high-output high-wage stationary equilibrium if it should want to
do so – all this in comparison with its having made the alternative decision to consume
more generally. No more [is] implied by any position I have ever maintained – and I
have maintained that general position for some decades now.

Samuelson’s 1961 presumption that reduced consumption, under full employment, will
lower interest rates in a new stationary equilibrium with expanded production
possibilities is, by 1966, recognized as generally incorrect – a result that Samuelson
came to regard as the sole significant theoretical advance to emerge from the capital
theory controversy. In a footnote to his famous “Summing Up,” he acknowledges that:

The reversal of direction of the [interest rate, net national product] relation was, I must
confess, the single most surprising revelation from the reswitching discussion. I had
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thought this relation could not change its curvature if the underlying technology was
convex, so that there had to be a concave, basic Fisher (intertemporal) productionpossibility frontier … I had wrongly confused concavity of [the production possibility
frontier] with concavity of the [interest rate, net national product] steady-state locus …
[R]eswitching reveals this possible curvature phenomenon, but is not necessary for it
(Samuelson 1966: 577, fn. 6).

Samuelson further acknowledged a general exception to the underlying idea of
diminishing returns along the transition path to lower interest rates:

Lower interest rates may bring lower steady-state consumption and lower capital/output
ratios, and the transition to such lower interest rates can involve denial of diminishing
returns and entail reverse capital deepening in which current consumption is augmented
rather than sacrificed. There often turns out to be no unambiguous way of characterizing
different processes as more ‘capital-intensive,’ more ‘mechanized,’ more ‘roundabout,’
except in the ex post tautological sense of being adopted at a lower interest rate and
involving a higher real wage.33 Such a tautological labeling is shown, in the case of
33

A year earlier, Samuelson wrote to Robinson (23 August 1965): “If the Levhari proof

is valid, for such systems it is not possible to find contradictions and flaws in a
definition of more-mechanized, more-round-about, more-capital-intensive
configurations of the system at lower profit rates.” The reference is to Levhari (1965),
later shown to have contained an error (Levhari and Samuelson 1966). With the false
proof withdrawn, the “contradictions and flaws” Samuelson had referred to were
granted to be entirely possible, as shown by various examples of re-switching, using
indecomposable technologies.
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reswitching, to lead to inconsistent ranking between pairs of unchanged technologies,
depending upon which interest rate happens to prevail in the market. If all this causes
headaches for those nostalgic for the old time parables of neoclassical writing, we must
remind ourselves that scholars are not born to live an easy existence. We must respect,
and appraise, the facts of life (ibid.: 582-583).34

Samuelson was intent on correcting his own error concerning the direction in which
interest rates were likely to move following an act of “abstaining” from consumption.
He dubbed it “Samuelson’s false theorem – the rate of interest will be (if anything)
lower at the higher plateau of consumption” (Samuelson 1976: 14), acknowledging that
“traces of this view” could be found in “my elementary Economics, somewhere around
the sixth edition…in the appendix on interest theory [Samuelson 1964: 595-596, as
noted in Samuelson 1966: 579, fn. 8] and in one or another of my letters to Robinson
one might find this false theorem.” His most detailed discussion is found in the
published papers presented of a Conference on Capital and Macroeconomics held in
Buffalo, New York, in March 1974:

Even if that other false theorem, which for my sins I planted in the mind of Levhari, had
not been false…Samuelson’s false theorem would be false since
34

Robinson dismissed the possibility of finding empirical evidence of reswitching:

“Nothing could be more idle than to get up an argument about whether reswitching is
‘likely’ to be found in reality” (Robinson 1975a: 38). She had earlier made the same
point: “[E]quilibrium positions with different rates of profit and the same ‘state of
technical knowledge’…are not found in nature and cannot be observed” (Robinson and
Naqvi 1967: 591).
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indecomposability…cannot rule out the innumerable contradictions to Samuelson’s
false theorem. Why the false theorem is false, which is to say why I should have
discerned this fact from the beginning, is indicated briefly in footnotes 6 and 9 of
Samuelson (1966: 577, 579)” (Samuelson 1976: 14, fn. 5). Mea culpa, on multiple
occasions, meant only35 that, “the most general neo-neoclassical case of a concave
homogeneous, Fisher-Solow intertemporal [production] frontier…does not, repeat not,
have all the familiar properties of the simpler Clark-Ramsey-Solow-Swan-Meade
parable” (Samuelson 1976: 15).

Samuelson lists thirteen propositions true for the parable. Observing that only three can
remain standing in his most general case, he goes on to say that, on the question of the
relationship between steady-state consumption and steady-state interest rates, there is
one definite result that emerged from the capital theory controversy. The necessary and
sufficient condition for steady-state consumption to be higher, when the excess of the
steady-state interest rate over the growth rate is also higher, is that the real Wicksell
effect should “fail to be negative” (Samuelson 1976: 19), a result proved by Burmeister
(1976). Samuelson takes pains to point out that an inverse relationship between the
capital-output ratio (the capital-labor ratio) and the rate of interest is not the issue. Only
the sign of the real Wicksell effect, which is the price-weighted sum of changes in the
35

Under the heading, WHAT THE CAPITAL THEORY CONTROVERSY TAUGHT

ME, only this false theorem (Samuelson 1989: 137-139) is mentioned. None of the other
issues – and certainly not the central problem of uncertainty in economics raised by
Robinson in her published work and in her letters to Samuelson concerning the
controversy – were deemed worthy of comment. This is remarkable in an article
devoted entirely to his memories of their interactions!
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vector of physical capital goods, matters. When the effect is negative – as in the parable
– the economy is “regular” (see ibid.).36

4. General Assessment of the Correspondence

Robinson’s arguments concerning income distribution and the meaning of capital, the
process of capital accumulation, and, most importantly, the problem of “getting into
equilibrium” were never fully embraced by Samuelson, but, in his correspondence with
her, he was unfailingly polite – if a little wary of her influence. Certainly, he was taken
aback by the interest of students in the capital theory controversy and what he saw as its
political overtones, writing to Solow (9 July 1973):

If this were all merely a tempest in the advanced seminar room of capital theory, it
would all be comical. But, honest to goodness, the new left thinks that the ‘other
Cambridge’ breakthroughs have shown up the emptiness of mainstream economics
when it comes to a theory of distribution. Three times I’ve given general lectures on
new trends in economics … The first two times, at the New School and Wisconsin, I
never even mentioned the Robinson-Sraffa critique of marginal-productivity
36

In more recent work, Burmeister observes: “There is some irony in the conclusion

that a well-behaved aggregate production function exists when (and probably, for all
practical purposes, only when) the Marx EOCC [equal organic composition of capital]
condition holds. Unfortunately, the conditions required for EOCC are so exceedingly
stringent that they are unlikely to be realized in any actual economy” (Burmeister 2008:
344). Nevertheless, the aggregate production function lives on as a seemingly valid
theoretical construct in myriad textbooks.
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distribution; only to have students come up to me after the lecture and reproach me for
not having mentioned this great new wave of the future. The third time I knew better
and brought it up myself.

In a subsequent letter (19 July 1973), Samuelson muses on the best way that he and
Solow might respond to the “misstatements” and “misrepresentations” he found in the
draft of Robinson (1975a) which she had sent him:

This could of course be done in a joint note…but that might be construable as a united
front by a desperate and beleaguered official MIT and, to use Schumpeter’s phrase, one
wouldn’t dream of using so big a cannon to crush so little a peanut … Murray
Brown…is running next March a 2-day symposium on all this. I’ve little desire to
go…the thought of being in a room with…some of those who’ve made a career of this
subject will drive the strongest man into the field of plumbing.

Stepping back from the frustrations evident in some of their letters, the question
remains: Why did Robinson and Samuelson fail to come to any sort of mutual
understanding? The answer turns on the problem of uncertainty and how each
protagonist viewed this long-standing bane of the formalist. Solow was clear: “The
fundamental difficulty of uncertainty cannot really be dodged; and since it cannot be
faced, it must simply be ignored” (Solow 1963: 15), while Samuelson, in a letter to
Solow (19 July 1973), was uneasy about making such a drastic move, actually granting
Robinson her point, while seeming to keep up the faith: “She is on to a real problem
here; but she goes overboard in her nihilism that no kind of roughly good foresight is
possible in dynamic paths outside golden age balanced growth.”
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Lack of candor aside, formalism also played a role. While Robinson acknowledged her
limitations,37 she understood that assumptions underlying a formal technique are not
always recognized for what they are: “The account which the economist gives of the
assumptions required for his technique is often very misleading. ‘The formulae are
wiser than the men who thought of them,’38 and the technique knows a great deal more
37

When Ragnar Frisch invited her to be a Vice-President of The Econometric Society,

“I said that it was no good for my name to appear on the cover of the journal when I
could not understand anything inside it” (Robinson 1975b: iii). “The Rate of Interest”
(Robinson 1951) was, however, published in Econometrica on the insistence of Frisch
who wanted “to get more prose into [the journal, and who] paid me the very valuable
compliment of saying that I had Ricardo’s instinct for making realistic simplifications”
(Robinson 1975b: iii). In “Thinking About Thinking,” Robinson remarked that, “I had a
very literary education and to this day I know only the mathematics that I was able to
pick up in the course of trying to formalize economic arguments” (Robinson 1979:
115). She did seem to have had a knack for seeing “the resolution of complex logical
and even mathematical problems without any knowledge of mathematics,” as Richard
Goodwin experienced first-hand (see Goodwin 1989: 916), but the mathematics that
appeared in her writings was generally relegated to Appendices, written by others.
38

Robinson was quoting Heinrich Hertz, who established the existence of

electromagnetic waves, theorized by Cambridge mathematician James Clerk Maxwell.
Hertz had written: “One cannot escape the feeling that these mathematical formulae
have an independent existence and an intelligence of their own, that they are wiser than
we are, wiser even than their discoverers, that we get more out of them than was
originally put into them” (Hertz cited in Sheldrake 2012: 87-88). Hertz celebrated the
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about the assumptions that it requires than the economist who is expounding it”
(Robinson 1932: 8). Potts (2000: 73), referring once to Robinson (1962b), effectively
addresses the point she had made thirty years earlier, arguing persuasively that in the
algebraic structure known as a field, one finds the root cause of many unresolved
controversies.39 The field concept is essential to the analytical economics Samuelson did
so much to establish, but nowhere in discussions of its entailments (e.g. Samuelson
1983: 148-153; de la Fuente 2000: 24-37),40 does one find a critical discussion of its
implications for the connections – mutual and complete – that are assumed to pre-exist
among all economic agents over space and time:

Field theory allows complete off-the-shelf mathematical formalisms [e.g. dynamic
programming] and analytical principles … [I]ts appropriation was much influenced by
the temptations of mathematical respectability, and, it must be acknowledged, this
has…brought enormous success. But the fact remains that unlike physical space,
economic space is not amenable to a field representation because it is not integral in the
sense that every element (that is, agent) affects every other element. This is a wholly
power of mathematics to generate unexpected results and novel problems. Robinson
was wary of the ways in which it can restrict the types of questions that can be asked in
a subject like economics.
39

His bold thesis is that all heterodox economics, of which he presents a sweeping

survey, can be broadly understood as a rejection of the field concept as the foundation
for analytical economics.
40

For an everyman’s guide to algebraic structures, rings and fields, there is nothing to

match the grace and elegance of Allen (1962), a book written with all the depth and
insight of his better-known text, Allen (1938).
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satisfied empirical condition for physical field theory but for reasons both definitional
and observational it is a most audacious step to define an economic system as anything
remotely resembling a perfect integral (Potts 2000: 25; italics added).

A complete exegesis of Robinson’s arguments with Samuelson in terms of this
opposition between field-based theory and the imperfect, incomplete, mutable
connections that characterize the economic life of firms, households, and other
institutions would take us far afield. Nevertheless, this opposition – once appreciated in
its full complexity – provides a clarifying backdrop to the otherwise ill-understood
aspects of Robinson’s efforts to grapple with “Time in Economic Theory” (Robinson
1980b) and with “History versus Equilibrium” (Robinson 1974). In the end, she did not
think that she, or anyone else,41 had accomplished much, concluding her life’s work on
a despairing note: “[T]he whole complex of theories and models in the textbooks is in
need of a thorough spring cleaning. We should throw out all self-contradictory
propositions, unmeasurable quantities and indefinable concepts and reconstruct a logical

41

Here, one must mention Brian Loasby, whose work was known to Robinson. She

evidently enjoyed learning of his discovery that, “‘Pretending to forecast the future’
shall be classified as disorderly under…the [New York State] Code and liable to a fine
of $250 and/or six months in prison” (Robinson 1977: 1,322).There is, however, no
evidence that Robinson had read the first of his many books (Loasby 1976) published
during her lifetime. It offered just the sort of critique of the information structure of
mainstream economic theory that would have addressed her Keynesian-inspired
concerns about knowledge and expectations. Loasby’s work is cited throughout Potts
(2000).
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basis for analysis with what, if anything, remains” (Robinson 1985: 160).42 Certainly, a
never-ruptured equilibrium of supply and demand maintained over an infinite time
horizon under conditions of perfect foresight would, for Robinson and others,43 qualify
on all three fronts! And, yet, one wonders, is there no other logical basis for analysis
that mathematically oriented economists might embrace?

A resurgent evolutionary economics, relieved of its association with the now discredited
biological notion of a competitive selection process effecting optimal outcomes (see
Potts 2000: 34), treats connections among economic objects on a par with the objects
themselves. Local and partial interactions are all that occur. Analysis of such interactions requires the use of a non-integral space, replacing the algebraic structure of a
field with something else. As Robinson recognized, however, tractability of assumptions
prompts “the optimistic, analytical…economist [to] choose the manageable set”
(Robinson 1932: 6) and certainly the field assumption is manageable. Where would the
differential and integral calculus be without it? But nowadays, combinatorics and, in
42

This posthumously published paper, originally dated December 1980, was a work-in-

progress, “The Theory of Normal Prices, Spring Cleaning.”
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“Should complete foresight be an indispensable postulate…there results that wider

paradox that the science has already posited the object that it is first to investigate; that,
without this assumption, the object could not exist at all” (Morgenstern (1935) [1976]:
175). “The intertemporal equilibrium is not an object of analysis, it is not a statement of
what is to be determined. It is simply the name attached to the solution of a set of
equations. Modify the equations – say by working with expected prices rather than a full
set of futures markets – and a new ‘equilibrium’ emerges as the solution of the new
equations” (Eatwell 2012: 3-4).
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particular, graph theory are sufficiently well developed to provide something else, a
logical basis for a new type of economic analysis which casts aside the integral space44
upon which so much current theory has been built (see Kirman 1987: 559). Of course,
the path forward will not be an easy one, but with a fuller understanding of how the
field concept and associated integral space has restricted the types of economic
questions that can be formulated, perhaps enough young economists will perceive
another “lovely vacuum” (Samuelson 1983: xxv) into which to pour their energies. The
potential payoff is enormous to the extent that it lays a foundation for an evolutionary
growth theory45 fulfilling Robinson’s goal of generalizing Keynes’s General Theory, a
project that neither Samuelson nor Solow saw as having anything to do with the theory
of capital accumulation.46
44

The word “integral” sometimes appears in the context of evolutionary analysis so that

the question of whether such analysis requires a non-integral space remains open. See
Donkers (2016).
45

The traditional foundation for increasing returns as found in Smith (1776) [1976] and

Young (1928) is described as “wholes into parts” or downward complementary by
Dopfer et al. (2016: 757), who then place “parts into new wholes” or upward
complementary on the same footing.
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Samuelson makes one concession in a letter (9 July 1973) to Solow: “If from relative

factor supply side no distribution of income theory is possible, then a Kaldor-Keynes
macro theory might be in order to try to fill the vacuum. That’s the only sense in which
‘generalizing the General Theory’ and ‘post-Keynesian versus pre-Keynesian processes
of accumulation’ are relevant.” Solow (3 July 1973) had been more adamant: “Keynes
has nothing to do with it one way or the other, since nobody is being Keynesian in the
sense of having output limited by effective demand rather than by supply side
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